Detail: http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=2701 =================== CFJ 2701 (Interest Index = 0) ==================== The LNP is a player ======================================================================== Caller: ais523 Judge: G. Judgement: TRUE ======================================================================== History: Called by ais523: 20 Sep 2009 23:04:59 GMT Assigned to ə: 23 Sep 2009 22:23:20 GMT ə recused: 12 Oct 2009 23:41:14 GMT Assigned to BobTHJ: 14 Oct 2009 18:03:45 GMT BobTHJ recused: 21 Oct 2009 19:24:16 GMT Assigned to Yally: 25 Oct 2009 16:23:40 GMT Yally recused: 07 Nov 2009 19:16:37 GMT Assigned to Warrigal: 07 Nov 2009 19:18:27 GMT Warrigal recused: 17 Nov 2009 11:44:41 GMT Assigned to Tiger: 17 Nov 2009 11:45:40 GMT Tiger recused: 22 Nov 2009 22:41:34 GMT Assigned to G.: 28 Nov 2009 23:48:54 GMT Judged TRUE by G.: 29 Nov 2009 07:14:20 GMT ======================================================================== Caller's Arguments: On Thu, 2009-09-17 at 15:58 -0500, Pavitra wrote: > This may possibly save you, but I'm still not convinced that "to intend" > is a proper action, despite its grammatical status as a verb. In its > natural-language meaning, which I maintain that the Rules do not > overwrite, "I intend" is a description of a passive mental state, like > "I understand" or "I doubt". It's not an activity that can be either > effective or ineffective, like lifting a box or spending a coin. > > In short, I am arguing that intent is (1) like contracts, recognized > rather than defined by the Rules; and (2) a passive mental state, like > the state of a switch, rather than an action, like flipping the state of > a switch. If Pavitra's argument above is correct, then partnerships cannot intend to perform dependent actions (allegedly a non-action) without the text of a message that would let them do it being published. ======================================================================== Gratuitous Arguments by Pavitra: If a contract provides an internal mechanism for accomplishing X, then beginning that formal, contract-defined process causes the contract to intend to do X. (This interpretation derives naturally from the proposition that formal systems and minds are largely the same thing, and that human minds are merely particularly complex systems. I grew up on Hofstadter and I'm proud of it.) ======================================================================== Gratuitous Arguments by ais523: The issue here is about whether intent is an action (therefore, this ties in with the arguments about the Points Party). The LNP was picked here because it cannot act on its own; only via act-on-behalf. If intent is indeed an action, then everything worked just fine. If it isn't, however, the quoted part of R2263 prevented the intent from working, by preventing the LNP doing anything at all; (a) wasn't met, as no message was given, and (b) and (c) cannot be met unless an action is involved. So the LNP registered if and only if an intent is an action. ======================================================================== Gratuitous Evidence by ais523: The text of the LNP: {{{ A Livenomicer CAN act on behalf of the LNP to cause it to intend, with Agoran Consent, to register, and to resolve this intent. }}} R2263: {{{ Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, acting on behalf of a person is INVALID if not published. Such publication is INVALID unless it specified the text of the simulated message by: (a) clearly stating the text of a message; (b) clearly specifying an action (the message states the grantor performs the action); or (c) performing by announcement an action defined in a public contract's text to (clearly and unambiguously) include causing the grantor to perform a specific action (the message states the grantor performs the action) }}} ======================================================================== Judge G.'s Arguments: There are two possible uses of "intend" here: 1. A specific announcement of intent as per R1728, or a similar/ parallel formal legal "expression of intent" defined in a contract; 2. The "mind-state" of a conscious entity that has decided it plans to perform some action: "the state of a person's mind that directs his or her actions toward a specific object." An important point is that #2 is really irrelevant to this discussion. Insomuch as we still (vaguely and with reservations) accept the ca.2007 assertion that a partnership might be some sort of "natural" albeit secondary type of person in the absence of legislation, there is no suggestion in written or natural law that this makes it a conscious entity with a mind that can be directed towards an object[*]. Thus, a contract can only "intend", or "express intent", in a manner formally recognized by its own charter or the rules governing its charter (in this case Agoran rules). So if a contract, or its governing rules, explicitly define a process of "expressing intent" then it can do so; but beginning a formal process for a general action is not sufficient for saying that the contract "intends" to perform the action (this is a similar fallacy to searching for "original intent" among a group of lawmakers). I will also point out that, even for a conscious entity, arguably, posting an "announcement of intent" as per R1728 is a defined legal announcement, and does not necessarily express a natural "actual" intent (i.e. state of mind) of any kind! So "intent" (expressing, feeling, or having) isn't an action, but "posting an announcement of intent" is. And I find that the LNP contract text "cause it to intend, with Agoran Consent" is a clear and obvious enough reference to R1728 that it empowers the indicated entities to "post an announcement of intent" as R1728 requires whether or not the poster (or the contract) naturally "intends" to complete the action. Therefore this worked. TRUE. [*}Only when a contract is sufficiently complex that we may talk meaningfully about its free will or at least passing a Turing Test, may we accept that it might express or possess a "natural" intent. But once we accept that, we could no longer treat it as a second- class person, and questions about its invididuality with respect to its contract would be raised, to say the least. ========================================================================