==============================  CFJ 1295  ==============================

    The Orders issued by Blob in <20010508144200.E5865@cse.unsw.edu.au>
    http://www.escribe.com/games/agora-business/m3682.html are
    improperly or invalidly executed.

========================================================================

Caller:                                 Razl

Judge:                                  Evantine
Judgement:                              TRUE

Appeal:                                 1295a
Decision:                               REASSIGN


Judge:                                  Lindrum
Judgement:                              FALSE

Appeal:                                 1295b
Decision:                               REASSIGN


Judge:                                  solublefish
Judgement:                              TRUE

========================================================================

History:

Called by Razl:                         09 May 2001 00:07:14 GMT
Assigned to Evantine:                   11 May 2001 02:12:07 GMT
Order(s) stayed:                        14 May 2001 17:57:42 GMT
Judged TRUE by Evantine:                17 May 2001 08:01:46 GMT
Order(s) issued:                        17 May 2001 08:01:46 GMT
Appealed by Taral:                      18 May 2001 00:16:32 GMT
Appealed by Kelly:                      18 May 2001 02:26:39 GMT
Appealed by lee:                        18 May 2001 19:00:24 GMT
Appeal 1295a:                           18 May 2001 19:00:24 GMT
Judgement distributed:                  19 May 2001 20:28:46 GMT
REASSIGNED on Appeal:                   23 May 2001 15:01:11 GMT
Assigned to Lindrum:                    25 May 2001 23:26:29 GMT
Judged FALSE by Lindrum:                30 May 2001 13:22:25 GMT
Order(s) issued:                        30 May 2001 14:58:04 GMT
Appealed by Murphy:                     03 Jun 2001 22:50:47 GMT
Appealed by Evantine:                   04 Jun 2001 03:31:51 GMT
Appeal 1295b:                           04 Jun 2001 16:48:41 GMT
Appealed by G.:                         04 Jun 2001 16:48:41 GMT
Order(s) stayed:                        05 Jun 2001 00:56:26 GMT
REASSIGNED on Appeal:                   12 Jun 2001 00:25:40 GMT
Assigned to solublefish:                12 Jun 2001 01:13:07 GMT
Judged TRUE by solublefish:             18 Jun 2001 19:45:17 GMT

========================================================================

Caller's Arguments:

Orders to satisfy debts are regulated by Rule 1599/6 (Power=1).

Rule 1599/6 (Power=1):
>     The Executor of the creditor of any unsatisfied debt may, at
>     any time, Order the debtor to satisfy that debt; but e may not
>     do so if any other Order neither satisfied nor vacated exists
>     requiring the same debtor to satisfy the same debt, or if the
>     debt is disputed. The debtor shall have seven days to satisfy
>     the debt from the time the Order is executed.

Since:
 1) this type of Order is regulated by Rule 1599/6;
 2) Rule 1599/6 restricts the target of such Orders to the debtor
    only;
 3) and the Notary is not the debtor of the debts mentioned in the Order,
I conclude that the Order was improperly or invalidly executed.

Debtor is defined by Rule 1596/5 (Power=1):
>     A "debt" is an obligation arising under these Rules for one
>     entity (the "debtor") to make a transfer of one or more
>     Properties to some other entity (the "creditor").

========================================================================

Judge Evantine's Arguments:

Summary of the Argument:

The Orders in question are Administrative Orders.  Orders are regulated.
That means that they do not fall under the permissibility
clause of Rule 101.  Hence, if a Order is to be valid, it must be
explicitly permitted by the rules.  The Orders in question are not
explicitly permitted by the Rules, therefore, they are invalid.  We
need not address the issue of whether the Orders were proper.

Detailed argument:

First, let me state the context of the CFJ.  The CFJ is called under
the auspices of Rule 1809, which states that "Both Administrative and
Private Orders are subject to appeal by CFJ, the statement of which
Statement alleges that the Order is improperly or invalidly
executed." I'm not sure why the extra occurrence of the word
"Statement" appears in this rule, however, the meaning is clear enough for
our purposes to establish this CFJ as an appeal of the Orders mentioned.

The first question is what type of Order these are.  Rule 1794 states that
"Each Order is of one of the following classes...".  This means it cannot be
more than one type.

Blob explicitly stated, "As Executor of the Bank, ..." in preface to the
Orders.  This indicates an intent to issue the Orders in an Administrative
capacity in the course of performing the duties of that Office.  Blob was
the Executor of the Bank at the time the Orders were given, so the question
remains, does the performance of the duties
of the Office of Executor of the Bank permit such Orders to be given?

Razl cites Rule 1599 in his argument.  The text of this rule is reproduced
above. Razl's argument is that the Rule in question only allows  the
Executor of a debt to issue Orders to the debtor only, and that the Notary
is not the debtor, therefore, the Order cannot be given.

There are actually two questions here.  First, whether the Rule explicitly
allows such an Order to be issued, and second, whether there is some sense
in which the Order may be implicitly allowed, by invoking the spirit of Rule
101's permissibility clause.

As to the first question, we must answer whether the Notary can be
considered to be the debtor, under the general spirit of Rule 1908.  I think
not.  The Notary may be the Limited Executor, but this is far from being the
debtor.  The Executor does not take on the debt, they merely
have the power to administer it.  I therefore agree with Razl, that rule
1599 does not explicitly allow the Executor of the Bank to issue such an
Order.  By issuing these particular Orders, Blob was in fact moving out of
the explicitly prescribed duties of the office of Executor of the Bank.

However, what about the argument that the Rules do not explicitly forbid the
Executor of the Bank to issue such an Order; it should therefore be allowed
under the general permissibility clause of Rule 101?  Let us examine the
permissibility clause in detail. The clause states "Whatever is not
prohibited or regulated by a Rule is permitted and unregulated".  There are
two distinct notions here, that of "whatever is not prohibited"
and that of "whatever is not regulated".  It states that anything falling
into both of these categories must be "permitted and unregulated."  It does
not state that "Anything
that is not prohibited is unregulated" or "Whatever is not regulated is
permitted."  The action in question MUST be both prohibited and unregulated
for this rule to apply. Orders are regulated; there are several rules that
regulate Orders.  Does this mean that ALL Orders fall outside of the
applicability of this clause, or does it mean that whenever the rules don't
provide restrictions, Orders
are permissible?  What is the guideline?

The Rules provide the appropriate guideline (1796).

      The Rules must permit
      the Player who executed the Order in question to execute such an
      Order, that the execution of the Order must have been required
      by or permitted in the circumstances which existed at the time
      it was executed"

However, how has this standard been interpreted over time?  It has been read
in conjunction with Rule 101 to reach different conclusions depending on
what the Rule 101 permits.   I turn to previous judgments to attempt to
reach resolution of this question.  Some of these relate only to Private
Orders, although the issue for Administrative Orders
is very much the same.  Also, some address whether the Orders were "proper"
and some whether the Orders were "valid", and sometimes these two ideas are
intermingled.

1172 by Chuck.  Chuck wrote: "The Rules do not define "improperly", which
essentially leaves it up to the Courts to determine the validity of
Administrative and Private Orders. IMO, it is in the best interests of the
game for the Courts to place firm restrictions on Players' ability to issue
Private Orders, requiring there to be some compelling
reasons for a Private Order to be valid (such as an agreement between
Players) and requiring the Order's commands be commensurate with such
reasons."

This standard for Private Orders was reinforced by several later judgments,
such as 1191 by Elysion.

In CFJ 1191, Elysion wrote:
"I note that CFJ 1172 set a strong precedent regarding Private Orders, and I
see no reason to overturn it."

On the question of validity of Orders, Judgment on Appeal in 1237 by Elysion
is relevant.
Elysion wrote:

"In other words, if something is regulated by the Rules, then Rule 101 no
longer automatically grants permission."

In general, the thrust of Elysion's judgment on Appeal was that Orders were
indeed regulated.  The Appeal specifically overturned the notion that
Private Orders were presumed valid by Rule 101, and in fact brought the
Judgement into accord with the spirit of 1172.

I reached a more restrictive conclusion in CFJ 1274 in which I wrote,
"Nowhere in the Rules is this  type of order permitted, required, or even
described. Thus, we must assume that it was invalid."   The standard here
was "presumptive invalidity", that is, unless the Rules can be construed to
"require" or "(explicitly) permit" a given type of
Order, then it should be assumed to be invalid. In other words, we read Rule
1796 as if it says "explicitly permitted", rather than liberally as in the
sense of "permitted and unregulated" by Rule 101.  The reason for this
reading is primarily that Orders are not unregulated, and therefore Rule
101, in Elysion's words, "no longer automatically
grants permission."

This standard is a wise one given the chaos that we have
seen arise from the question of Orders that are not required or defined by
the Rules.  Rather than executing an Order and waiting until the resolution
of a CFJ to see if the Judge agrees that it as a valid Order, only Orders
that are arguably set forth as  permissible in the Rules should be allowed.
The Rule which allows a particular Order
should perhaps even be indicated as a accompaniment to the Order.

I do not see this as in contradiction to the earlier judgments on this
issue, only a tightening of the standard, which in fact is a progressive
trend that can be seen starting from CFJ 1094.  Elysion explicitly wrote
about the fact that Rule 101 does not give "carte blanche" to any
orderer.  By this standard, the Orderer must have firmer footing on which to
rest.  This trend was reversed by the appeal of CFJ 1237 in a appellate
judgment given by Kelly, which we address below.

I wish to also add another comment regarding Rule 101.  The spirit of Rule
101 should also be applied to the affected entity of the Order.  We should
not have a system whereby anything that is not adequately covered by the
Rules is subject to regulation by an anarchic system of
Orders issued by Officials and individual players.  This type of system
severely restricts the free will of individual players in ambiguous
situations not addressed by the Rules, which is what Rule 101 is trying to
protect.  Such a system also infringes upon certain
inherent or implicit Rights of Players, the existence of which is
established by CFJ 1252.

These conclusions were concurred with most recently by Peekee in the
Judgment of CFJ 1293.

As a side note, we should also consider whether it is possible that these
Orders are not Administrative and default to be Private Orders?  No.  These
Orders were given "As Executor of the Bank".  As such, if they do not meet
the standard of Administrative Orders, they are invalid Administrative
Orders, not Private Orders.  If Blob had simply issued the Orders as Blob,
then we could consider them Private Orders.

As an addendum to this CFJ, I specifically address Justice Kelly's argument
in the appeal of CFJ 1237, since this judgment represents a strong departure
from the standard given by Kelly in that appeal.

Kelly wrote:
"The lower court correctly noted that the Rules provide no explicit
authorization for the execution of this Order.  Of course, this does not end
the inquiry, since Rule 101 creates a clear bias in favor of permissibility,
except where Rule Changes are at issue. Even if we accept that the making of
Private Orders is regulated (which is a fair conclusion),  we cannot
conclude from Rule 101 that the making of any given Private Order is
forbidden merely because not explicitly authorized.  Rule 101 provides clear
indication for a contrary
conclusion, in fact; if Rule 101 worked in this manner, then Rule 101 would
not explicitly create a different standard for Rule Changes.  With the
exception of Rule Changes, Rule 101 is clearly silent on the question as to
whether a regulated activity may be engaged in
without explicit authorization in the Rules."

I argue that Rule 101 does not provide a "clear bias" in favor of
permissibility.  I would agree wholeheartedly with Kelly here if Rule 101
merely said "Whatever is not prohibited
is permitted and unregulated".

  It does not for the reasons stated above, namely, that Orders are
regulated.  Rule 101 only applies for that which is unregulated.  This is
clear from the phrase "not prohibited or regulated"
which we take to mean "neither prohibited nor regulated".  In other words,
only in the absence of both situations would the permissibility clause be
applicable.

Kelly also wrote:

"Nor does Rule 1796 provide any basis for concluding that the Order is
disallowable; Rule 1796 merely states that an Order is valid if it is
permitted.  Using Rule 1796 to find that an Order is not permitted because
it is not permitted (as the trial court did) is
circular reasoning.  Rule 1796 sets a standard of review only; it provides
no substantive guidelines for determining whether permission exists.  The
trial court erred in reading a standard of review as substantive law."

We explicitly disagree.  Because Rule 101 is not applicable, "permitted" in
Rule 1796 means "explicitly permitted", in other words, spelled out or
called out by a rule.

"The question of whether a given Private Order is permissible, when that
Order is neither required by the Rules nor prohibited by them, is a question
which requires a full examination of the circumstances in which the Order
was executed.  The trial court is required to apply such standards as are
reasonable in the circumstances in deciding
whether an Order was permissible; in this case, matters as to whether the
Order furthers  justice, equity, or fairness would be pertinent in making
this decision.  Had the trial court made an thorough examination of the
facts of the situation and found the Order invalid based on such an
examination, I would defer to that court's judgement.  But no
such examination has been made.  I therefore find error in the trial court's
failure to analyze the facts of the situation to determine whether this
Order should be permitted to be executed."

The above standard suggests that pretty much all Orders other than those
explicitly defined by the Rules will be appealed by CFJ, hardly conducive to
clarity  and timeliness of resolution of issues.

Lastly, this Judge finds that the above standard as defined by Kelly is
inconsistent with Rule 101.  Rule 101's permissibility clause is meant to
ensure that no regulations exist apart from what the Rules state.  Rule 101
emphatically does NOT state that "whatever
is not prohibited or regulated by the Rules is regulated by Orders", which
is the direction we are headed if we allow such Orders to be considered
valid. Orders not explicitly defined by Rules have become a regulatory
mechanism that is outside the scope of the
Rules.  As such, Rule 101 forbids them.

========================================================================

Judicial Order(s) by Evantine:

Persuant to the finding that the aforementioned Orders by the Executor of
the Bank were invalid, I order that the Orders by the Executor of the Bank
in question be vacated.

========================================================================

Appellant Taral's Arguments:

Points of error:

1. The Judge erred in determining that Administrative Orders were not
   presumed valid.

2. The Judge erred in determining that the Orders in question were
   Administrative Orders.


Support for point 1:

Relevant text from Judge's Arguments:
 ---
 On the question of validity of Orders, Judgment on Appeal in 1237 by Elysion
 is relevant.
 Elysion wrote:

 "In other words, if something is regulated by the Rules, then Rule 101 no
 longer automatically grants permission."

 In general, the thrust of Elysion's judgment on Appeal was that Orders were
 indeed regulated.  The Appeal specifically overturned the notion that
 Private Orders were presumed valid by Rule 101, and in fact brought the
 Judgement into accord with the spirit of 1172.
 ---
(I note that the text in double quotes is from Judge Oerjan's Judgement,
not Judge Elysion's.)

The principle of Oerjan's Judgement was that Orders were
regulated and that this made Private Orders also regulated. However this
is the very principle that was rejected by the Board of Appeals. The
relevant quote (Appeal of CFJ 1237, Justice Wes's Arguments):

 ---
 Oerjan appears to Argue that since various other activities regarding
 Orders are regulated, such as Amending them, Vacating them and
 enforcing them, that all activities regarding Orders would therefore
 be considered to be regulated. We reject this assumption.

 There are many Rules regulating what a Player can and cannot do. They
 are allowed to perform some actions, disallowed from performing other
 actions. There are FAR more Rules regulating the actions of Players
 than there are regulating the function of Orders. But this by NO
 means causes all actions that a Player can make to be regulated -
 only those actions which are addressed in the Rules.

 Likewise, while we can find many Rules regulating various actions
 having to do with Orders, we can find no Rule regulating the actual
 creation of Private Orders. Since this is not regulated, and also
 not prohibited, we find that it is quite allowed.
 ---

This argument applies equally to Administrative Orders.


Support for point 2:

Relevant text from Judge's Arguments:
 ---
 The first question is what type of Order these are.  Rule 1794 states that
 "Each Order is of one of the following classes...".  This means it cannot be
 more than one type.

 Blob explicitly stated, "As Executor of the Bank, ..." in preface to the
 Orders.  This indicates an intent to issue the Orders in an Administrative
 capacity in the course of performing the duties of that Office.  Blob was
 the Executor of the Bank at the time the Orders were given, ...
 ---

Rule 1794 defines Administrative Orders as: "an Order executed by an
Officer in the course of performing the duties of that Office, except
when those duties involve active as a member of a Board of Appeals."

I contend that the Orders in question were not Adminstrative Orders
for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that the Executorship of the Bank
happens to be a privilege granted to a specific Office (the Treasuror)
is not sufficient to determine all actions using this privilege to be
performed in the form of the Officer. Secondly, since the Orders were
not a "dut[y] of the Office", they do not satisfy the requirement for an
Administrative Order.

========================================================================

Appellant Kelly's Arguments:

I believe the Judge should have given more consideration to the
possibility that the Orders were not Administrative Orders; the Judge
appears to have concluded this to be the case without explanation or
discussion.

========================================================================

Judge Lindrum's Arguments:

At the time the Orders were issued, Blob held the Office of Treasuror, and
was thereby Executor of the Bank.  Razl held the Office of Notary and was
thereby Executor for the debtors in question.

Rule 1599 states that "The Executor of the creditor of any unsatisfied debt
may, at any time, Order the debtor to satisfy that debt".  Judge Evantine
points out that the Executor of the debtor was not, in these cases, the
debtor emself.  That is true but irrelevant. The important issue is not
whether the Executor of an entity is the entity emself, but whether one may
issue an Order to an entity by issuing the Order to the Executor of that
entity.

Rule 1478 states that "[t]he Executor of an entity is a Player who is
empowered by the
Rules to act on behalf of that entity, as if e were that entity".

It is the opinion of this Court that Rule 1478 allows that one may issue an
Order to an Entity by issuing the Order to the Executor of that
entity.  That is not because the Executor is that entity, but because the
Rules allow that in such cases the Executor may be treated "as if e were
that entity".

Thus Blob's Orders were properly and validly executed.

========================================================================

Judicial Order(s) by Lindrum:

Pursuant to my judgement on CFJ 1295, I hereby vacate any previous Order to
stay the Orders issued by Blob in:

<20010508144200.E5865@cse.unsw.edu.au>
http://www.escribe.com/games/agora-business/m3682.html

========================================================================

Appellant Murphy's Arguments:

I Appeal this Judgement, on the following grounds:

1) Rule 1908 states that the Notary is Limited Executor, not Executor, of
   the debtors in question.

2) Rule 1478 allows an Executor to act as if e is the Executee, but does
   not deem the Executor to be the Executee for any other purpose.

========================================================================

Appellant G.'s Arguments:

My arguments are not identical to Murphy's.  This is the flip-side of my
most recent CFJ.  The validity of an Order issued towards a limited
executor is specifically defined for limited executors of the Bank, but
not for other types of limited executors, unless it is the duty of a
particular office to satisfy a debt.  The Rules, by use of the word "may",
specifically make it a discretionary matter (rather than a duty) for the
Notary to satisfy abandoned Players' debts.

========================================================================

Judge solublefish's Arguments:

Included here is my history of the events and arguments surrounding CFJ
1295.

1. Then-Treasuror Blob ordered then-Notary Razl to satisfy some debts on
behalf of some deregistered players. The Notary is Limited Executor of
said players.

2. Razl called the CFJ, arguing that the Order in question was invalid
or improper, since e (Razl) was not the debtor, only the Limited
Executor of the debtor.

3. The matter was assigned to Evantine, who ruled the Orders invalid. E
argued that:
    a. The Orders were Administrative, due to Blob's intent that they be
       so.
    b. The Notary is not the debtor, and thus cannot be Ordered
       (Administratively) under the auspices of rule 1599.
    c. The Rules demand non-permissive Administrative orders.
    d. Since they were Administrative and not explicitly allowed by any
       Rules (including 1599), the Orders were invalid. E did not reach
       any conclusion as to their propriety.

4. The matter was appealed by Taral, Kelly, and lee. The appeals court
(concurred by Kelly and Steve, dissent by Wes) holds that:
    a. The Orders were not Administrative simply because Blob wanted
       them to be. Rule 1794 states that Administrative Orders are those
       given in the course of official duties.
    b. The court defines "Duty" narrowly, to mean those responsibilities
       explicitly demanded by the Rules.
    c. The Orders were _not_ given in the course of perform duties
       defined this way, and thuse were not Administrative Orders. They
       are thus Private Orders.
    d. The court defines the validity of Orders (especially Private
       Orders) permissively, under 1796. Thus the Orders in question are
       valid.
    e. The court concludes that Judge Evantine should have addressed the
       problem of propriety, but does not address the issue iteslf,
       instead remanding the matter to a further court.

5. Lindrum judged the CFJ next. E deems the Orders valid and proper,
arguing:
    a. Rule 1599 allows Blob to treat the Notary (Razl) "as if e were"
       the debtor dues to eir being the Executor of the debtors.

6. The matter was appealed by Murphy, Evantine, and Goethe. Murphy argues:
    a. Lindrum erroneously ignored the fact that "Rule 1908 states that
       the Notary is Limited Executor, not Executor, of the debtors in
       question."
    b. "Rule 1478 allows an Executor to act as if e is the Executee, but
       does not deem the Executor to be the Executee for any other
       purpose." Thus, Lindrum erred in asserting that Razl could be
       treated as the debtor for the purpose of receiving Orders.
    c. Goethe argues that it is improper for an Order to direct a player
       in a matter over which e has discretion. "R1908 specifically
       grants the Notary discretion in the disposition of Abandoned
       Property"

7. Speaker Kelly reassigns:
    a. essentially citing Murphy's argument (6a) as invalidating
       Lindrums judgement.
    b. The court (Kelly) explicitly took no position on the possibility
       of Ordering a debtor by Ordering eir Executor (6b), as only a
       Limited Executor is involved in this case.
    c. The court (Steve) found (in accordance with Goethe's argument)
       that it is improper to Order a debtor by Ordering eir Limited
       Executor in the case where the debtor is an ex-Player and the
       L.E. is the Notary. It did not deign to make a generalized ruling
       on Ordering Limited Executors.

Since I am the fifth court rule on this matter, there are a number of
facts which have been established by courts before me. The following are
the important rulings made by prior (unappealed) courts:
    I. There is no disagreement about the occurance of the events of the
       case.(1)
   II. Given the interpretations made in the first appeal, the Orders
       are Private and valid. (4d)
  III. Given the interpretations made in the second appeal, the Orders
       are improper. (7c)

If I am to respect these unappealed judgements made by prior courts, I
must rule the statement of the CFJ TRUE. The orders are improperly
executed, as they attempt to direct a player in a matter over which the
Rules grant em discretion.  I will note that the only bit of this case
which seems to be setting new precedent is Goethe and Steve's contention
that this constitutes impropriety. In addition to the fact that I feel
bound by the appellate court's argument, I concur with this argument. I
would like, if it is within the power ofthis court, to explicitly make
this assertion part of judicial precendent for the consideration of
future judges.

There is one other matter I would like to explicitly address. I believe
that in cases where a CFJ is propogated to further courts due to appeals
and such, it would be folly for a judge to address all the issues at bar
anew. Within the set of arguments and ruling made by all previous
courts, I believe that some should be discarded entirely by the latest
court, and some should be taken as given. I belive that these are easily
broken down.

I believe that if a court's ruling was overturned on appeal (whether
reassigned or not), its arguments should be discarded. Otherwise, a
court's holdings should be taken as given by further courts. For
instance, even if I disagreed with the second appeals court's contention
that orders of this nature are improper, I do not consider it my place
to do so. One court already handled that issue, and the only court
obligated to re-evaluate it would be an appellate court so directed.

I think that there are three arguments for the validity of this manner
of handling prior rulings. The first is that it makes the roles of
individual courts more clearly defined, and thus easier for any given
court to make an informed ruling. This leads to faster, more accurate
rulings.

Second, the Rules designate the manner in which matters may be
re-examined. They must be publically appealed by 3 players, assigned a
judge by the CotC, etc. I think that if later courts took to selectively
reexamining issues at whim, the spirit, if not the letter, of these
Rules would be contradicted. Essentially, such judges are claiming
precedence over prior judges on matters that the Rules do not grant them
precedence in.

Third, I think it would be dramatically more efficient for the judicial
system if fewer matters were reexamined. If forward progress in a case
is made, it seems a shame to lose all of it on every appeal. Since
rulings on one aspect of a case tend to have an impact on others, the
tree of decisions can be greatly pruned by this method. If complex
issues are to be decided in one week, this pruning is essential, I
believe.

Again, if it is within my power to do so, I would like to this method of
handling prior judgements to be considered as set by judicial precedent.

========================================================================