============================  Appeal 1295b  ============================


Panelist:                               Steve
Decision:                               REASSIGN


Panelist:                               Kelly
Decision:                               REASSIGN


Panelist:                               Taral
Decision:                               REASSIGN

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History:

Appeal initiated:                       04 Jun 2001 16:48:41 GMT
Assigned to Steve (panelist):           05 Jun 2001 01:01:58 GMT
Assigned to Kelly (panelist):           05 Jun 2001 01:01:58 GMT
Assigned to Taral (panelist):           05 Jun 2001 01:01:58 GMT
Kelly moves to REASSIGN:                11 Jun 2001 23:09:21 GMT
Taral moves to REASSIGN:                12 Jun 2001 00:16:12 GMT
Steve moves to REASSIGN:                12 Jun 2001 00:25:40 GMT
Final decision (REASSIGN):              12 Jun 2001 09:25:40 GMT

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Panelist Kelly's Arguments:

Judge Lindrum erred in holding that Razl was "Executor for the debtors
in question".  The Notary is not the Executor of an entity possessing
abandoned property; if e was, then the property in question would not
be abandoned.  See Rule 1908.  Thus, Judge Lindrum is incorrect in
stating that "[t]he important issue is not whether the Executor of an
entity is the entity emself, but whether one may issue an Order to an
entity by issuing the Order to the Executor of that entity."  This is
not at all an issue in this case, and this Court takes no position on
this matter at this time.

Since this holding was crucial to the formulation of eir judgement, I
see no alternative but to reverse and reassign.

I move that Judge Lindrum's decision be VACATED and that the matter be
REASSIGNED to another Judge, for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the opinions of this Court.

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Panelist Taral's Arguments:

I fully concur with this opinion, and also move that Lindrum's decision
be OVERTURNED and REASSIGNED.

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Panelist Steve's Arguments:

In the Appeal of Lindrum's Judgement in CFJ 1295, I also move to
overturn Lindrum's Judgement and re-assign the CFJ to a new Judge.

Lindrum argued that since R1478 empowers Executors to act "as if they
were" their Executees, it is proper for the creditor of an unsatisfied
debt to Order the Executor of a debtor to satisfy that debt, under the
provisions of R1599.

One of the Appellants, Murphy, objected to this argument, pointing out
that Notary Razl was not the Executor, but merely the Limited Executor,
of the ex-Players with unsatisfied debts. My initial reaction to this
argument was that Lindrum was entitled to a plausible assumption that a
Limited Executor inherits the powers of Executors under R1478 to act as
if e were the Executee. But Justice Kelly's remarks show that in fact
Lindrum's argument begs an important question about what powers Limited
Executors have with respect to Executees. If Notary Razl were the
Executor of the ex-Players, their Property would not be Abandoned under
the definition of that term in R1908, and Blob's Orders would be
obviously improper. On the other hand, if we insist on the distinction
between Executors and Limited Executors, Lindrum's argument gives us no
reason to think that a Limited Executor inherits the power in R1478 to
act "as if e were" the Executee, for that power is granted to only to
Executors. R1908, which defines the powers of the Notary, says only that
the Notary may "act on behalf of", not "as if e were", an entity with
Abandoned Property.

Goethe raised a second objection to Lindrum's Judgement. Lindrum
concluded that it is proper for a Player to issue Private Orders
requiring the Executor of an Executee with unsatisfied debt to satisfy
the debt. Goethe's objection was that we should not regard it as proper
for a Player to issue Private Orders imposing requirements on another
Player in a matter over which they have discretion. Lindrum relied in
his Judgement on the empowering provisions in R1599. But it seems to me
that those provisions make sense only because a debt is a defined as an
obligation to pay. That is, R1599 empowers creditors to Order debtors to
fulfil their obligations. But the Executors of debtors do not, in
general, inherit the obigations of their Executees. Executors are
granted powers with respect to Executees, but no Rule requires them to
exercise those powers. Furthermore, as Goethe noted, R1908 specifically
grants the Notary discretion in the disposition of Abandoned Property.
The applicability of the provisions in R1599 is therefore doubly
questionable.

These difficulties with Lindrum's Judgement persuade me that the best
course is re-assign the CFJ to a new Judge.

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