==============================  CFJ 1381  ==============================

    A Stem Tax Assessed or to be Assessed by the Payroll Clerk within
    the next 24 hours, was/will be legal.

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Caller:                                 G.
Barred:                                 t
Barred:                                 Crito
Barred:                                 Taral

Judge:                                  root
Judgement:                              FALSE

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History:

Called by G.:                           28 May 2002 03:03:17 GMT
Assigned to root:                       28 May 2002 04:48:27 GMT
Judged FALSE by root:                   04 Jun 2002 01:57:01 GMT

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Caller's Arguments:

(Linked with CFJ 1377)

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Judge root's Arguments:

  "A Stem Tax Assessed or to be Assessed by the Payroll Clerk within the
  next 24 hours, was/will be legal."

The Stem Tax announcement referred to reads:

    Proposal 4318 contained the following Legislative Order:

         THE PAYROLL CLERK IS ORDERED TO ASSESS A 50% TAX ON STEMS.

    In accordance with this Legislative Order, Payroll Clerk Murphy is
    Ordered to levy a tax on Stems of 50%. As Murphy's Prime Executor, I am
    required to perform all action e is required to perform.

    Therefore, acting as Payroll Clerk Murphy's Executor, on Murphy's behalf
    I announce a tax on Stems of 50%, without exemptions. This tax is
    authorized by R1891.

Rule 1853 requires that levy announcements include the Rule authorizing
the announcement; furthermore, this Rule must explicitly permit the levy
to be performed.  All other requirements of R1853 are trivially satisfied
by the announcement.

The announcement claims that the levy in question is authorized by R1891,
which reads:

    (a) A Proposal may contain one or more Orders.

    (b) The effect of adopting a Proposal which contains Orders is
        to execute those Orders.  Such Orders are known as
        Legislative Orders, are deemed to have been executed by that
        Proposal, and are deemed to have been executed as of the
        date of the proclamation of the Proposal's adoption.

    (c) Legislative Orders may not be stayed, vacated, or amended
        except:
      (1) by a subsequent Legislative Order;
      (2) by a Judicial Order issued only after a judicial finding
          that the Proposal containing the Legislative Order was not
          adopted, was barred from taking effect, or was invalid; or
      (3) by the Clerk of the Courts, but only for the purpose of
          staying such an Order during the pendency of a dispute
          which might reasonably lead to a judicial finding of the
          sort mentioned in subdivision (c)(2) of this Rule.

This Rule clearly does not directly permit any taxes to be levied.  This
is, however, the Rule that gives force to the proposal's Orders to levy
a stem tax.  The Order, however, merely requires that the tax be levied.
It cannot permit anything.

The caller argues that there is no way for the Payroll Clerk to levy the
tax within the time limits imposed by the Order.  However, I find that
this is not correct.  The Payroll Clerk could announce the intent to levy
the tax by R1917, then delegate the Office.  By Rule 1585, the delegate
would have a full week within which to perform the levy.  Even if this
were not the case, there is no reason why the Rules cannot require an
action without permitting it.  Think of it as a round-about way of saying
"The Payroll Clerk is guilty of Contempt by Inaction."

Steve argues that the requirement of performing an action implies the
capability of performing the action.  This would be nice in theory, but
this court sees no reason for it to be true.  This kind of permission can
be at best implicit, whereas R1853 firmly requires explicit permission to
assess the levy.  Furthermore, as has been shown, Rule 1917 already
permits the Payroll Clerk to assess the levy, subject to its restrictions.
In analogy, I am obligated by the Rules to pay my debts, but if I do not
have the funds then I cannot.  The necessary prerequisites for paying my
debts are not waived just because the requirements exist.  Likewise, the
requirements of R1917 are not waived just because the Payroll Clerk is
required to assess the levy and did not manage to announce eir intent on
time.

Since the levy as published is nowhere explicitly permitted, I must Judge
the CFJ FALSE.

Since the levy claimed to be authorized by Rule 1891 and not by Rule 1917,
the caller's remarks about Rule 1917 are irrelevant, but I wish to address
them anyway.  The caller claims that the Proposal itself served as intent
to levy, so that a levy authorized by Rule 1917 could be published
immediately after the adoption of the proposal.

However, Rule 1728 requires that the notice of intent for a dependent
action must be published by the same player or by the holder of the same
position as the performer of the action.  Since the proposal was published
only by OscarMeyr and later by Promotor t, and the levy was published by
Steve acting as Payroll Clerk Murphy, this condition is not met, and the
proposal can not be the intent to perform, at least in this case.

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