==============================  CFJ 1436  ==============================

    The Grand Warden of the Oligarchy is not empowered to remove from
    the Oligarchy a player who is not ineligible to be an Oligarch.


Caller:                                 Steve
Barred:                                 RedKnight

Judge:                                  G.
Judgement:                              TRUE



Called by Steve:                        11 Feb 2003 02:07:32 GMT
Assigned to G.:                         14 Feb 2003 04:11:13 GMT
Judged TRUE by G.:                      20 Feb 2003 21:02:22 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

The Rules are quite specific about how an Oligarch is removed from the
Oligarchy. The procedure is defined in R1963:

      (a) A Player is ineligible to be an Oligarch if and only if any
          of the following are true:

          (1) e is not active;
          (2) e has three or more Blots;
          (3) e is the Speaker;
          (4) e is the Electee to the Office of Speaker-Elect; or
          (5) e is the Grand Warden of the Oligarchy.

      (b) If an Oligarch becomes ineligible to be an Oligarch, the
          GWotO shall remove that Player from the Oligarchy as soon as
          possible.  The GWoTO removes a Player from the Oligarchy by
          correctly announcing that at least one of the above
          conditions is true for that Player.  The named Player ceases
          to be an Oligarch as of the GWoTO's announcement.

Note, "[t]he GWoTO removes a Player from the Oligarchy by correctly
announcing that at least one of the above conditions is true for that
Player." The conditions are the conditions for ineligibility. But if a
player is not ineligible to be an Oligarch, ie if none of the five
conditions apply to em, then the GWotO cannot correctly announce that
one of five conditions applies to em. Therefore the GWotO cannot remove
em under the provisions of R1963(b). No other procedure for removal of
an Oligarch is defined by the Rules. I argue that it follows that the
GWotO is not empowered to remove an eligible player from the Oligarchy.


Judge G.'s Arguments:

First of all, the simple part.  I find it to be true, by virtue
of the Caller's arguments, that the GWotO can't remove
a Player from the oligarchy if they are not ineligible to be an
Oligarch.  The only mechanism for removal is in Rule 1963 and
removal requires a truthful announcement of ineligibility.

But the tricky part is determining if this inability constitutes
lack of 'empowerment'.

At issue is the extremely powerful Rule 2039/0 (Power=3):
      Other Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, the failure to
      perform an action required by the Rules, where the person
      required to act was not empowered to do so, shall never
      constitute the commission of a Crime or Infraction.

'Empowered' is an extremely difficult word to interpret in
the Ruleset and is not directly defined.  The trouble can be seen
by examining the following two assertations:

Assertation 1:  The GWotO is empowered to remove ineligble
Players from the Oligarcy.  Due to the game state, Redknight is not
ineligible, so the GWotO can't remove em.  Therefore the GWotO is
not currently empowered to remove Redknight, even if another Rule
threatens penalty if e doesn't.  R2039 protect the GWotO.

Assertation 2:  I am empowered to transfer currency to pay debt X.
Due to the game state, I do not possess the required currency,
therefor I can't pay debt X.  Therefore I am not currently empowered
to pay debt X, even if another Rule threatens penalty if I don't.
R2039 protects me.

The trouble is, as evidenced by discussion, some legislators believe
that Assertation #1 is true while Assertation #2 is false, at that
somehow there is a reasonable "line" between #1 and #2 that makes #1 true
and #2 false.  Some legislators, however, believe that both are true.
[The 'intent' of R2039 won't help us, as the intent of the drafter
 of the legislation may not be the intent of the legislative body that
 voted for it].

So can we find a principle to draw the line?

'Empowerment' occurs in a very small number of places in the Ruleset.
Perhaps it is empowerment only when the Rules say 'empowerment' for
a very specific act.  Then Rule 2039 is extremely limited indeed,
as it covers only the ability of an officer to determine budgets
[R1957] and the ability of the Treasuror to transfer Bank currency

R1841 on Power of Attorney mentions empowerment but in an unhelpful
circular way:  If A has PoA over B, A is empowered to do whatever B
is empowered to do.

The closest thing to a definition of empowerment is found in Rule1478
(Executors and limited Executors), in part:

      (a) An Executor of an entity is a Player who is empowered by the
          Rules to act on behalf of that entity, who is called the
          Executee. There may be more than one such Player. An
          Executor of an Executee may perform on behalf of the
          Executee all such actions as the Rules permit the Executee
          to perform.

      (b) A Limited Executor of an entity is a Player who is empowered
          by the Rules to perform on behalf of that entity a subset of
          the actions which the Rules permit the entity to perform. A
          Limited Executor is permitted to perform on behalf of an
          Executee only such actions as are explicitly permitted by
          the Rules.

      (c) A Player is always eir own Executor. Other entities have
          Executors (or Limited Executors) only as and when the Rules

(a) and (b) imply that an a Player is "empowered" to perform an action
if the Rules explicitly name the Player to be the executor or the
entity (or by (b), limited executor w.r.t. the action), and if the
entity may perform the action.

And this empowerment extends to "all such actions that the Rules permit
the executee to perform".  (c) says that a Player is always eir own

Now the Rules don't state that "the GWotO is limited executor of
the Oligarchy for the purposes of removing ineligible players" but the
Rules don't generally make a distinction in permissions between an
Office and the holder of that office.  Therefore, as the holder of the
GWotO is eir own executor, e is empowered to perform whatever actions
the Rules permit the GWotO.

So the Rules do not permit em to remove not ineligible players from
the Oligarchy.  However, these Rules permissions are still caught up with
the game state.  Knowledge of the 'game state' outside the rules (but
implied by the text of the Rules) is required to determine if a player
is ineligible or not.  The GWotO is empowered to remove IF a player is
ineligible.  (note: this is not direct, but implied by the requirement
of posting the conditions of ineligibility).

Similarly, a Player is empowered to pay eir debts IF e has the funds.
But e is not able to pay if e has not the funds (again, not direct, but
based on the assumption of funds as 'positive possessions).

Do certain types of knowledge about the game state (ineligibility/
eligibility) turn off empowerment, while others (lack of funds for
debts) leave empowerment on?  This judge can find no basis for such
a distiction.

It is possible to argue that Rule 2039 protections don't apply when
players are not "required to act."  In other words, if the Rules
say "the GWotO shall X..." it's a requirement to act, but if the
Rules state "a Player may X, and if e doesn't X e gets an
infraction" is not a requirement but a choice.  This judge does
not find that this distinction exists, either.  The Rules do not
distinguish between breaking a "shall" clause or breaking a
"may..or else" clause in that both are mapped to the same mechanisms
for punishment.

Therefore, this judge judges TRUE.

But e notes that this breaks debts at least, if not a number of
other intentions of the ruleset to apply punishment for inaction.