============================  Appeal 1498a  ============================


Panelist:                               G.
Decision:                               SUSTAIN


Panelist:                               Murphy
Decision:                               REMAND


Panelist:                               RedKnight
Decision:                               SUSTAIN

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History:

Appeal initiated:                       21 Apr 2004 23:17:34 GMT
Assigned to G. (panelist):              22 Apr 2004 07:14:54 GMT
Assigned to Murphy (panelist):          22 Apr 2004 07:14:54 GMT
Assigned to RedKnight (panelist):       22 Apr 2004 07:14:54 GMT
Murphy moves to REMAND:                 29 Apr 2004 05:10:06 GMT
RedKnight moves to SUSTAIN:             29 Apr 2004 23:28:42 GMT
G. moves to SUSTAIN:                    30 Apr 2004 17:02:17 GMT
Final decision (SUSTAIN):               30 Apr 2004 17:02:17 GMT

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Panelist Murphy's Arguments:

Statement:  No two Rules may legally have the same Title.

Trial Judge Sir Toby made the following claims:

  * Some Rule-defined entities are nameless.
  * Multiple nameless entities do not violate R1586.
  * Rules are not required to have names.
  * Rules are nameless.
  * Rule Titles are not names.
  * The statement of the CFJ is FALSE.

While several fine points have been finely discussed, the only claim
that contradicts this ruling is the following combination:

  * "Name" is not directly defined by the Rules.
  * "Name" and "title" are ordinary-language synonyms.
  * Rule 754 (4) makes "name" and "title" synonymous for Agoran purposes.
  * Rule 1586 causes the statement of the CFJ to be obviously TRUE.

In some cases, "name" and "title" are synonymous.  In others, they
do not overlap at all (e.g. "Dr. Fred Fnordlinger").  In still others,
they may overlap in part; one may be a subset of the other.

In the specific case of Rules, does a Rule's name contain

  * the word "Rule"?
  * the Rule's number?
  * the Rule's title?
  * more than one of the above?
  * something different?

The answer to this question is not obvious to me.  This question was
not considered by Trial Judge Sir Toby, but I have no reason not to
believe that e is capable of considering it, now that it has been
pointed out.  As such, I move to OVERTURN and REMAND.

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Panelist RedKnight's Arguments:

In my study of this issue I have reached the conclusion that "title" is not
a synonym for "name."  It is important to note that the relationship is not
communitive, that is "name" is a synonym for "title."  In this case, the
important relationship is the first one.  From that I conclude that a rule
title does not have to be unique.  Therefore I move to SUSTAIN.

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Panelist G.'s Arguments:

I intend to apply the Appellate standard of only overturning
a Judge's rulings if it is utterly unreasonable or recklessly
disregards the facts.

After examining the discussion thread over the past few days,
this Justice opines that:
  1.  Titles of Rules are explicitly defined properties of Rules
      by R1485, and thus we are not bound by 754(4) to use a
      common-language definition for the 'Title' of a Rule.

  2.  R1586's 'name or nickname', for a Rule specifically, is not
      explicitly mapped to any particular Rules-defined property
      of that entity, so 754(4) applies to Rule names.

  3.  So Justice RedKnight's comment on commutivity is appreciated:
      We are not asking if an Rules-defined property 'name' is a
      reasonable synonym for the common usage of 'title', but whether
      the Rules-defined property 'title' is a reasonable synonym for
      the common usage of 'name.'

  4.  A primary common-language definition of 'name', is "a word or
      phrase that constitutes the distinctive designation of a person
      or thing." (Merriam Webster) or "A word or words by which an
      entity is designated and distinguished from others."
      (Dictionary.com)

  5.  The key of both definitions is "distinctive" or "distinguished",
      which is echoed in R1586's uniqueness requirement for 'name'.
      Thus a 'name', by common English, is the term used to distinguish
      one entity from another--and R1586 indicates that this is the
      appropriate definition to use.

  6.  No one in Agora, to this Justice's knowledge, has ever
      "distinguished" or "designated" a Rule by its title.

  7.  So this Justice does *not* find it unreasonable for a Judge to
      deny that the term 'name', in the sense of being a "designator",
      would be a synonym for a property that no one uses to designate
      the entity in question.

  8.  [It is beyond the scope of this Appellate decision to determine
      if  CFJ 1358 applies to Rule Numbers (although the personal
      opinion of this Justice that it does; CFJ 1358's position that
      'name' and 'title' are synonymous only applies if 'name' and
      'title' are both undefined by the Rules for a particular entity,
      and for Rules 'title' is defined).]

   Therefore, this Justice finds that the original Judge was reasonable,
   in stating that the property Rule title, as defined explicitly by
   R1485, is different enough from the common definition of 'name', in
   its sense as a unique designator directly implied by R1586, and to
   deliver the judgement e did.

   I move to SUSTAIN this Judgement.

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