==============================  CFJ 1622  ==============================

    the Pineapple Partnership is a person


Caller:                                 Pineapple Partnership

Judge:                                  G.
Judgement:                              TRUE



Called by Pineapple Partnership:        26 Feb 2007 09:17:17 GMT
Assigned to G.:                         07 Mar 2007 16:42:14 GMT
Judged TRUE by G.:                      13 Mar 2007 20:54:34 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

the Ruleset does not explicitly define "person", but R754(3) refers to
the legal definition.  In law a "person" is anything that can be the
subject of rights and duties, including corporations and partnerships.
The Pineapple Partnership is a partnership, and thus a person, under
ordinary legal definitions, and is constructed in the context of
Agoran law.  Hence it is a person under Agoran law.


Judge G.'s Arguments:

The question revolves around the definition of "person", which is not defined
 in the rules.  To choose from (after a survey of several dictionaries), we
 have "natural persons" and "legal persons."  (Other definitions of 'person'
 in dictionaries are clearly not relevant to the proceedings).

"Natural" persons, in dictionaries, are inevitably defined by the term
 "human".  In the past, we have directly dismissed questions of whether
 the Rules could deem humans to be pineapples or other objects as not
 relevant to the rules.  In fact, Agoran custom seems to indicate that
 it prefers non-discrimination, that we would as a whole welcome (for
 example) an AI suitably advanced to be taken as a Turing-Test passing
 individual without trying to determine whether or not it was human,
 and indeed that Agoran law has no way of distinguishing such an entity
 from a "natural" person.  Since all definitions of natural persons rely
 on humanness, I reject this definition out of deference for Agoran Custom,
 and note that it is the most consistent interpretation arising from the
 recent Agoran debate and new CFJ precedents surrounding types of fruit.

The legal definition defines a person as (Merriam-Webster-online) "one (as a
 human being, a partnership, or a corporation) that is recognized by law as
 the subject of rights and duties."  The current reading of Rule 101,
 arguably the single overarching statement of Agoran custom, explicitly
 leads the rules by laying out and recognizing rights of persons.  Therefore,
 I judge this definition to be the correct one to use.

Does the Pineapple Partnership qualify as such a person?  "Partnerships" in
 general enjoy the status of persons in common definition, so it is
 left to determine if the Pineapple Partnership is in fact a partnership.
 To quote Zefram in the matter:  "The agreement creating the Pineapple
 Partnership contains all the legal elements to construct a partnership.
 Principally, it is an entity distinct from the partners, obligations on
 the Partnership become obligations on the partners, and this is all
 legally binding (via the contract).  Unlike incorporation, partnership
 is quite a lightweight concept.  It comes naturally out of contract law."

I find this argument reasonably persuasive, and therefore find that the
 Pineapple Partnership should be treated as a partnership in general,
 and hence as a legal person insomuch as the jurisdictions governing it
 allow, and in specific (since Agoran law does so allow), it should be
 considered a person under Agoran law.  I therefore return a judgment
 of TRUE.