==============================  CFJ 1666  ==============================

    if two binding agreements each purport to construct a partnership,
    and the set of partners is the same for both, then the two
    agreements construct and govern a single partnership.

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Caller:                                 Zefram

Judge:                                  The Hanging Judge
Judgement:                              FALSE

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History:

Called by Zefram:                       14 May 2007 20:36:11 GMT
Assigned to The Hanging Judge:          22 May 2007 01:00:42 GMT
Judged FALSE by The Hanging Judge:      23 May 2007 20:11:11 GMT

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Caller's Arguments:

As discussed in CFJs 1622 and 1623, the essential feature of a legal
person is that it is "the subject of rights and duties".  In Agora,
natural persons qualify as legal persons by being directly bound by
the rules.  Partnerships, by contrast, have been constructed by using
contracts to transfer rights and duties around.

A partnership agreement (concretely, consider one in the Pineapple style)
defines an entity, the partnership, which can be the subject of rights
and duties.  The agreement stipulates that these rights and duties devolve
onto the partners.  The legal personhood arises precisely because there
is an underlying subject of rights and duties, by a mechanism that is
binding under the rules (and hence recognised by Agoran jurisprudence).
The subject of the partnership's rights and duties is, of course, the
partners, collectively.  Presuming that the partners are all natural
persons, this set of persons is distinct from any of those persons
individually, and so the partnership is a distinct legal person from
any of the partners.

If there are two partnership agreements with the same set of partners,
then the subject of the partnership's rights and duties is the same in
both cases.  By the plain definition of legal personhood, this means
that there are not two distinct legal persons thereby constructed.
There is only one non-natural legal person, and its personal identity
is the (single) set of partners.  I therefore urge a judgement of TRUE.

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Judge The Hanging Judge's Arguments:

(pseudo-judged by Murphy due to a bug in the judge eligibility rule)

I interpret a partnership's identity, not merely as the set of its
members, but as the agreement defining that set.

I pseudo-judge CFJs 1666 and 1667 false, as direct consequences of the
above interpretation.

I interpret the status of a partnership in the face of changes to the
agreement's membership (and/or text, for that matter) as covered by
Rule 1586 (Definition and Continuity of Entities), and thus pseudo-judge
CFJ 1668 false.

I have maintained these interpretations since before Quazie and I came
up with the HPn scam, and continue to maintain them in the face of Yin
and Yang's attempted proof of concept.

I would support the adoption of legislation explicitly supporting these
interpretations, but removing legal personhood to partnerships with less
than two natural persons underlying them (after recursing through as
many levels as necessary).

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