==============================  CFJ 1667  ==============================

    if there is a partnership agreement A, defining a partnership PA,
    for which the partners are a partnership PB and one of PB's members
    M, then PA is the same legal person as PB.

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Caller:                                 Zefram

Judge:                                  The Hanging Judge
Judgement:                              FALSE

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History:

Called by Zefram:                       14 May 2007 20:36:11 GMT
Assigned to The Hanging Judge:          22 May 2007 01:00:42 GMT
Judged FALSE by The Hanging Judge:      23 May 2007 20:11:11 GMT

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Caller's Arguments:

I refer to the argument I supplied for the previous CFJ, in which I
expounded the legal theory that the personal identity of a partnership of
natural persons is precisely the set of its members.  This CFJ extends
the theory to the situation where the members of a partnership are not
all natural persons.

The legal identity of a partnership is, as I have argued, determined by
who is the subject of its rights and duties.  In the situation of this
CFJ, rights and duties of PA are (via A) rights and duties of PB and M,
collectively.  But we cannot end analysis there, because this is only
an acceptable subject of rights and duties if each of PB and M is also
an acceptable subject of rights and duties.  So we must look at where
rights and duties of PB go.  They are, via PB's defining agreement B,
rights and duties of M and other members.  M now appears twice in our
collection of underlying persons, but this matters not: M is simply
bound by both A and B.

M and the other members of PB may all be natural persons.  If so, our
analysis is complete: rights and duties of PA are rights and duties of
a set of natural persons that includes M.  M does not appear twice in
this set: e is only a single person emself, although constrained by more
than one agreement.  The set of natural persons on whom the rights and
duties of PA fall is the same as the set for PB.  As it is these sets
that constitute the personal identity of partnerships, PA and PB are the
same legal person.  If the members of PB are not all natural persons then
the analysis must continue to other levels, but the ultimate result is
the same.  I therefore urge a judgement of TRUE.

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Judge The Hanging Judge's Arguments:

(pseudo-judged by Murphy due to a bug in the judge eligibility rule)

I interpret a partnership's identity, not merely as the set of its
members, but as the agreement defining that set.

I pseudo-judge CFJs 1666 and 1667 false, as direct consequences of the
above interpretation.

I interpret the status of a partnership in the face of changes to the
agreement's membership (and/or text, for that matter) as covered by
Rule 1586 (Definition and Continuity of Entities), and thus pseudo-judge
CFJ 1668 false.

I have maintained these interpretations since before Quazie and I came
up with the HPn scam, and continue to maintain them in the face of Yin
and Yang's attempted proof of concept.

I would support the adoption of legislation explicitly supporting these
interpretations, but removing legal personhood to partnerships with less
than two natural persons underlying them (after recursing through as
many levels as necessary).

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