==============================  CFJ 1792  ==============================

    If the announcement of Partnership 1's Contest had been received by
    the listserver sixty seconds before the announcement dissolving it,
    all other factors being equal, Partnership 1's Contest would have
    allowed any first-class player to become a party

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Caller:                                 omd

Judge:                                  G.
Judgement:                              FALSE

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History:

Called by omd:                          13 Nov 2007 00:06:31 GMT
Assigned to G.:                         13 Nov 2007 11:16:36 GMT
Judged FALSE by G.:                     19 Nov 2007 20:35:24 GMT

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Caller's Arguments:

Why do you expect me to provide arguments?  Nobody else has.

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Judge G.'s Arguments:

Judge Eris, in CFJ 1777 (now sustained), found that the contest
didn't actually come into existence until the first contestant
joined it.  This leads to the odd interpretation that a contest
doesn't "allow" anyone to join until someone's joined it!  But
clearly, we allow the first person to join.  Eris notes that this
is very nebulous in the definition of agreements in general.

Two possible interpretations can be applied to get out of this
nebulous state of affairs for satisfying R2136(c) before the first
member is added:
   1.  It is the agreement text (not the existing agreement)
       which must allow any first-class player to join.
   2.  It is the net effect of the rules that must allow any
       first-class player to join.

The instigators of the scam (at the time of the scam) clearly
favored interpretation #1.  This Court agrees with this
interpretation, as it is not the job of the agreement to ensure all
is right with the rules; this is in opposition to several gratuitous
arguments which were supplied (including by the current Court).

However, the term "allow" in R2136(c) is not explicitly defined
in the Rules.  So how must an agreement text allow joining?  In
particular, does "allow" apply to the MAY in Rule 2152 (attempts to
join are permissible) or does "allow" imply CAN (attempts to join
succeed; there is a mechanism).  The rules seem to use "allow"
interchangably for CAN or MAY.

This court finds that both CAN and MAY are *both* required to
constitute "allowing" for R2136(c).  For example, trivial obstacles
in the contest text itself (let's call them "Vladivostok Clauses")
would not allow all players to join.  Both the permission and method
must exist within the contest text and be reasonable to all players.

What is the method for joining the contest?  It is consent.  And
while "consent" is not explicitly defined in the rules, R101(iv) and
(v) strongly imply that this must be communicated, informed consent.

This court finds that there is a minimal time between when a person
first is able to see an agreement and when e has been "allowed"
a reasonably sufficient time to form and communicate informed
consent.  For a particular player this may vary, but to allow this
for ALL players, as explicitly required by R2136(c) requires time
that accounts for Agoran customs of gameplay, email delays, etc.

Note that this represents a middle ground between #1 and #2 above;
the contest need not ensure the net effects of all Rules allow
joining, but must ensure that the availability of the contest
text itself allows sufficient time for review to all players.  It
is also possible that a sufficient time is required before the
contest awards points, in the name of "fairness" (R2136e).  Since
this time is for review, supplying the contest text in a discussion
forum before initiating it (e.g. a proto) may start ths clock.

This court finds that, in absense of a more specific guidance, the
96 hours for obtaining objections is reasonable.  Note that this is
even shorter than time found reasonable by precedent (CFJ 1571),
although that was for Officer response.  In any case, the time
required is certainly greater than sixty seconds or sixty minutes.
This court finds FALSE.

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