==========================  Equity Case 1886  ==========================

    BobTHJ has not deregistered.

========================================================================

Caller:                                 Murphy
Barred:                                 BobTHJ
Barred:                                 G.
Barred:                                 omd
Barred:                                 pikhq

Judge:                                  Zefram
Judgement:                              

========================================================================

History:

Called by Murphy:                       28 Jan 2008 19:02:26 GMT
Assigned to Zefram:                     29 Jan 2008 07:39:57 GMT
Parties informed:                       29 Jan 2008 11:58:57 GMT
Pre-trial phase ended:                  05 Feb 2008 11:58:57 GMT
Judged  by Zefram:                      11 Feb 2008 17:48:11 GMT

========================================================================

Caller's Arguments:

Contract:  Vote Market
Parties:  BobTHJ, Fookiemyartug, P2P Partnership, Goethe, comex,
          Murphy, pikhq

On January 14, BobTHJ incurred an obligation to deregister.  On
January 16, e published a Cantus Cygneus, and was deregistered in a
Writ of FAGE, but e has not satisfied eir obligation to deregister
(Rule 869 defines the active "to deregister" as a proper subset of
the passive "to be deregistered").  Furthermore, e avoided the 30-day
wait imposed by Rule 869 following normal voluntary deregistration.

It could be argued that this scam should be rewarded by allowing it
to work as intended.  Since the obligation comes from a contract, a
criminal judge cannot effectively waive punishment; if e delivers a
judgement less severe than EXILE, then a subsequent equity case could
still impose a new requirement to deregister, and a second criminal
case could then bypass the double-jeopardy restriction by attempting
to punish the violation of the new requirement.  Thus, I recommend that
the judge consider whether to impose a new agreement absolving BobTHJ
of eir original obligation.

========================================================================

Gratuitous Arguments by pikhq:

I (the person responsible for causing BobTHJ to need to deregister) agree to
let BobTHJ get away with his Writ of FAGE method of scamming it.

========================================================================

Gratuitous Arguments by G.:

I think that "causing oneself to be deregistered" reasonably fit the spirit
of the agreement.  There was nothing inequitable about the way e did this.
Eir requirement to meet the 30-day waiting period before re-registering was
inferred, not a necessary part of the contract.  E was also punished to the
extent that eir properties were reset (though I don't know what eir properties
were at the time).

========================================================================

Judge Zefram's Arguments:

I held back on judging this in the hope that CFJ 1897 would be resolved
first, because if it determined that BobTHJ has in fact deregistered
(via eir deputy) it would then be very easy to judge that equity has
been satisfied, despite the delay in deregistration.  As it is, CFJ 1897
is still unresolved, so I must judge CFJ 1886 without knowing BobTHJ's
current registration status.

Firstly, I reject BobTHJ's argument that e had deregistered as required.
As root pointed out, the wording of BobTHJ's sell ticket clearly falls
under the default reflexion clause of rule 869.  BobTHJ's obligation
was specifically to deregister emself, not merely to be deregistered.
Eir indirect triggering of eir own deregistration does not qualify;
to deregister oneself, as "to deregister" means by default, refers to
the direct act which rule 869 says is accomplished by announcement.
Thus BobTHJ did not satisfy eir obligation to deregister in a timely
fashion.  This is a basically inequitable situation.

If BobTHJ has deregistered subsequently, outside the initial time
limit, then I consider this to be a reasonably equitable substitute
for satisfying eir original obligation.  The lateness has not made any
substantial tactical difference, for example due to interaction with the
voting period of any critical proposal.  I find it unlikely that pikhq's
motivation in filling BobTHJ's sell ticket was dependent on the precise
one-week time limit; it seems more likely that the motivation was more
generally to keep BobTHJ out of the game for the 30-day auto-exile period,
and reset eir various player-specific properties.  Time was not of the
essence in BobTHJ's obligation.

If BobTHJ has not deregistered subsequently, the question arises of
whether eir deregistration by Writ of FAGE is an equitable substitute.
If e had remained a non-player for 30 days, as e would have been required
to if e had deregistered emself, then the overall effect would be the
same, and so it would be equitable.  However, e did not; e returned
a mere 30 minutes after being deregistered, a serious difference
in effect.  Goethe suggests that the 30-day exile was not core to the
obligation, but I find that it is such a direct and significant effect
of self-deregistration that in fact it was.  BobTHJ's deregistration by
Writ does not on its own satisfy equity.

However, the opinion of parties to the contract has some direct
significance to the case.  Hypothetically, if all parties were to agree
to forgive BobTHJ eir obligation, then this could be construed as an
amendment to the contract.  Whether expressed as an amendment or not,
it would be inequitable to not grant such forgiveness its intended effect.

Of the parties, pikhq has explicitly agreed to accept BobTHJ's
deregistration by Writ as satisfying the obligation, and Goethe has
expressed the opinion that it is satisfactory anyway.  Murphy, caller
of this CFJ, has not made any submission about this, and nor has comex.

Generally, all parties to a contract are entitled to have all the
contractual obligations enforced.  Those who have not made submissions
can generally be assumed to not forgive another party's obligations.
However, the Vote Market is not a normal contract in the structure of
its obligations.  Its primary purpose is to broker obligations between
pairs of its parties, rather than anything with larger numbers of parties.
The principle of enforceability by any party must be applied to matters
concerning the integrity of the Vote Point currency and the self-amendment
clauses, but it is not so sensible for the obligation resulting from a
filled Ticket.

I find that BobTHJ's obligation to deregister is, for the purposes of
equity, best viewed as an obligation specifically to pikhq, the filler of
the Tickets.  Although the obligation is imposed by means of a contract
that has several other parties, the intent of that obligation has the
nature of a contract between BobTHJ and pikhq alone.  This is supported
by the fact that none of the other parties have made any submission
regarding forgiveness of BobTHJ's obligation.  Indeed, there has been
little submission of any kind from the other parties.

pikhq has agreed to forgive BobTHJ's obligation, and I find that that
is the only forgiveness that is significant to equity.  Of course,
unlike a unanimous forgiveness by the contract parties, this does
not automatically have the status of an amendment to the contract.
Its status is merely that it makes it inequitable for this court to
enforce the obligation or to impose any substitute obligation on BobTHJ.

There are therefore only two possible judgements that this court can
reasonably make.  Firstly, the null judgement, leaving the obligation
extant but unenforceable at equity.  Secondly, a judgement could
discharge BobTHJ of eir obligation entirely, formally imposing pikhq's
forgiveness on the other parties to the Vote Market.  This court finds
no necessity for the latter, more complex, judgement, and so opts to
leave the situation unchanged.  I hereby enter as judgement in CFJ 1886
an empty agreement.

========================================================================