============================  Appeal 2101a  ============================

Panelist:                               BobTHJ

Panelist:                               ehird

Panelist:                               ais523

Panelist:                               OscarMeyr
Decision:                               REASSIGN

Panelist:                               Wooble
Decision:                               REASSIGN

Panelist:                               Murphy
Decision:                               REASSIGN



Appeal initiated:                       09 Aug 2008 20:59:43 GMT
Assigned to BobTHJ (panelist):          13 Aug 2008 23:36:52 GMT
Assigned to ehird (panelist):           13 Aug 2008 23:36:52 GMT
Assigned to ais523 (panelist):          13 Aug 2008 23:36:52 GMT
BobTHJ recused (panelist):              08 Sep 2008 00:38:55 GMT
ehird recused (panelist):               08 Sep 2008 00:38:55 GMT
ais523 recused (panelist):              08 Sep 2008 00:38:55 GMT
Assigned to OscarMeyr (panelist):       08 Sep 2008 02:46:51 GMT
Assigned to Wooble (panelist):          08 Sep 2008 02:46:51 GMT
Assigned to Murphy (panelist):          08 Sep 2008 02:46:51 GMT
Wooble moves to REASSIGN:               12 Sep 2008 20:00:39 GMT
OscarMeyr moves to REASSIGN:            14 Sep 2008 00:02:37 GMT
Murphy moves to REASSIGN:               15 Sep 2008 22:43:55 GMT
Final decision (REASSIGN):              16 Sep 2008 00:20:40 GMT


Gratuitous Arguments by omd:

On Sat, Aug 9, 2008 at 3:06 PM, Kerim Aydin <kerim@u.washington.edu> wrote:
> I support this.  The equity case process, when coupled with appeals,
> means that any party has an opportunity to "review" an agreement amendment
> imposed by equity, thus not conflicting with R101(v).  (Note that R101v
> is written so that you don't have to agree to the amendment, just have
> to have a chance to review it.  For example, an amendment that you vote
> against in a majority voting process, or is imposed through equity, is
> still binding to those who vote against it as long as the process gave
> voters adequate time for review).  R101(iv) refers to becoming party to the
> initial agreement, not the equity result; agreeing to become party
> to the initial agreement as "binding" under these Rules means explicitly
> agreeing to a process in the Rules for enforcing the binding, and that
> is currently the equity process.  Otherwise the term "binding" has no
> meaning.

The first half of this argument is irrelevant: I only referenced Rule
101 (v) to the effect that it, by mentioning amendments, is in
contrast with Rule 101 (iv), which does not.  In fact, I agree that
equations do not violate Rule 101 (v).  Furthermore, I agree that Rule
101 (iv) refers only to becoming party to new agreements.  But even if
you could somehow argue that "I agree to a contract" constitutes
EXPLICIT agreement to some judicial process based on a Rule that
(depending on when I agree to the contract) hasn't even been enacted
yet, I NEVERTHELESS have the right (by the first sentence) to refuse
to become party to ANY new binding agreement.  Even if I have
implicitly or even explicitly consented in the past, there is nothing
in Rule 101 which says that I cannot change my mind, especially
because "no binding agreement... may abridge, reduce, limit, or remove
a person's defined rights".  The fact that I've previously agreed to
an agreement cannot infringe my right not to agree to a new one.
There is absolutely no language in the Rules, game custom, or
precedent to the effect that this right can and is signed away with
such simple actions as agreeing to contracts.

And it is clear that an equity result is a new agreement, not an
amendment to the existing one.  If the text to that effect and strong
implication by Rule 2169 ("In this role [equations are] subject to
modification or termination by the usual processes governing binding
agreements.") is not sufficient to prove this, consider an equity case
initiated by a non-party to a pledge.  In this case, the equation has
a _different set of parties_ than the original contract.

As I said, it would be very easy and I think has been proposed to make
equations amendments and therefore more effective (although the pledge
thing would have to be fixed).  I'll be voting against it, though.

> I intend, with 2 support, to appeal the judgment in CFJ 2101.  It's
> reasonable to think that 101(viii), 101(iv), and game custom in nomic,
> not just in Agora but going back to Suber's publication of The Paradox
> of Self Amendment, combine to create an implied ability to completely
> cease to be a participant in Agora by announcement, releasing a person
> of all obligations under Agoran rule and contracts given authority
> under that rule.  This ability would mean that a person's right to not
> be bound by an agreement is not violated by Equity judgments binding
> em as long as e chooses to participate in Agora either as a player or
> in the general sense. Any precedent to the contrary should be ignored
> as it doesn't take into account the history of nomic, the best
> interests of the game, and common sense which says that game-imposed
> obligations cannot, in general, be applied to non-participants by the
> definition of what it means to play a game.

I find it even harder to see any value in this argument.  If this is
set as precedent, R101 (iv), (v), (vi), and (vii) are all completely
worthless because the right of persons not to become party to binding
agreements, be considered bound by agreements which they have not had
the reasonable opportunity to review, participate in the fora, and not
be penalized more than once for a single action or inaction can all be
satisfied by deregistration.


Panelist Wooble's Arguments:

I intend, with the support of my co-panelists, to cause the panel in
CFJ 2101a to judge REASSIGN, with instructions to consider the
appellants' arguments.