==============================  CFJ 2136  ==============================

    CFJ 2050 was filed by ehird

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Caller:                                 omd

Judge:                                  BobTHJ
Judgement:                              


Judge:                                  Murphy
Judgement:                              TRUE

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History:

Called by omd:                          14 Aug 2008 05:27:56 GMT
Assigned to BobTHJ:                     15 Aug 2008 07:08:32 GMT
BobTHJ recused:                         15 Aug 2008 16:49:10 GMT
Assigned to Murphy:                     26 Aug 2008 23:31:15 GMT
Judged TRUE by Murphy:                  08 Sep 2008 00:38:55 GMT

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Caller's Arguments:

First, CFJ 2050 cited CFJ 1895.  The issue in CFJ 1895 was basically
whether the Rules can act as if one person (Zefram) held the
"position" of being another (BobTHJ).  That is, the Rules want to act
as if Zefram IS BobTHJ.  But this brings up issues, such as "if we
assume that Zefram is BobTHJ, whom do we assume is Zefram?"  There is
no such issue with one person *causing another* to act, where all we
are pretending is that a different person sent a message.

Second, Judge Wooble claimed that "CFJ 2050 was filed by ais523, on
behalf of ehird."  It seems that e was suggesting that the
on-behalf-of-ehird bit was just a sort of explanation of the cause of
the CFJ, as I might initiate criminal CFJs 'on behalf of' the AFO',
because it is not able to initiate them: there is no legal
significance of ehird in relation to that CFJ.  I'm not sure, however,
if that is actually what e meant; that bit of the judgement was
somewhat unclear.

Third, the precedent of CFJs 1833-5, the precedent of earlier CFJs,
and game custom is undeniably that a person can indeed cause another
person to act via a prior arrangement, whether the latter person is a
partnership or of a biological nature.

Fourth, as I said, CFJ 2050 cited CFJ 1895 as its reasoning.  However,
Judge Goethe's arguments in CFJ 1895 specifically and repeatedly
mention that executorship is a valid construct!

Now, said arguments imply that when one person acts on behalf of
another, the latter's "telos" did not actually cause the action to
take place, but rather it is just a legal fiction wherein we are
pretending that e did.  There is no such thing as a "player object" in
Agora (compare to, say, B).  If we recognize avatar theory, then if I
normally act alone, but you act on behalf of me, two different persons
caused actions to take place, but a single avatar is considered by the
Rules to have performed all of my actions.  The existence of such a
"player object" is easy to infer into existence.

In Agora, however, I actually sent both emails, or at least that's
what the legal system is required to pretend, and this is problematic.
 A legal fiction of this magnitude really ought to be explicitly
described, but there has traditionally been no text in the Rules to
the effect that such a fiction exists.  (You could argue now that the
partnership rules imply this, but that was not the case at the birth
of the Pineapple Partnership.)  Nevertheless, very, very strong game
custom holds that executors work, and there is no real argument
brought up now by anyone to overturn such a (by now) long-standing
precedent.

And then again, these analogies are so far removed from the actual
text of the Rules that I would not call myself unduly negligent if I
missed ten other interpretations of how messages manage to change
their authors on the way from computers to the list.

Finally, since I am going to advocate the use of git for reports, I
feel that it is appropriate to be a git in this message.
Specifically, "whom do we assume is Zefram?" is grammatically
incorrect: it should be "who do we assume is Zefram?"

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Judge Murphy's Arguments:

Long-standing game custom holds that "X CAN do Y on behalf of Z"
creates the legal fiction that Z does Y (except when an inquiry
explicitly attempts to address the on-behalf-of mechanism, which the
statement of 2136 does not).  TRUE.

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