==============================  CFJ 2302  ==============================

    Warrigal MAY transfer assets


Caller:                                 ehird

Judge:                                  G.
Judgement:                              TRUE



Called by ehird:                        07 Dec 2008 19:59:32 GMT
Assigned to G.:                         10 Dec 2008 22:40:21 GMT
Judged TRUE by G.:                      12 Dec 2008 06:56:50 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

IRRELEVANT is obviously not true, as Warrigal may have just
violated the contract by doing the above. UNDETERMINED is not
either - tons of paradoxes could be judged that, anyway, but they're
and we don't need ambiguity in the gamestate like this. (Well, we do,
explicitly tagged as one). A correct TRUE or FALSE would get you $1mil
for solving the Riemann hypothesis's truth value, and I doubt the Agoran
courts will produce an answer relating to that.




Gratuitous Arguments by ehird:

On 7 Dec 2008, at 18:12, Elliott Hird wrote:

> I CFJ on the statement "Warrigal is a party to the Wormhole".

I retract this CFJ and CFJ on the statement "Warrigal MAY transfer

I also submit all arguments submitted to the quoted CFJ by anyone as


Gratuitous Arguments by Murphy:

None of us have access to a proof or disproof of the
Riemann hypothesis, so by Rule 2197 ("its permissibility cannot be
determined with certainty at the time it is attempted") Warrigal's
attempt to join was ineffective, so straightforward TRUE.


Judge G.'s Arguments:

The text of the agreement in question reads in part:
> Warrigal can join this contract if and only if the Riemann
> hypothesis is false.
followed by Warrigal's attempt to join this contest by announcement.

If the phrase above were in the Rules, it would indeed set up an
undecidable condition and a paradox.  The rules, by being unlimited in
scope (R2141/2) are able to set a legal conditional contingent on
wholly unknown and or unknowable "truths" without worrying or caring
whether the truth of the matter can be practically resolved.

On the other hand, if the phrase were used as part of a player's
conditional announcement "I give Goethe 3 coins if the Riemann
hypothesis is false", it would fail.  Except for the case of conditional
votes which are explicitly regulated, conditional action announcements
are a courtesy of Agoran custom and not Rule, similar to "I do X N
times".  In these, the conditional is allowed to succeed if resolving
it does not cause undue burden.  In particular, CFJ 1460 specifically
cites a Riemann Hypothesis conditional as an example of a failed
(i.e. wholly thrown out) communication attempt.

So, if the phrase is part of a contract, is it more like a Rule or
a player's statement?  It is in fact somewhere in between.  In
particular, while the text of a contract is judicable as a logical
and legal construct, the Rules do not grant contracts the same broad
ability to set game conditions on par with R2141/2.  The fact that
R1742/17 defines a contract as simply "agreement between one or more
persons" suggests that, in general, agreements cover the sorts
of things that players generally can do, and do not extend to the
full scope of what rules can do.  Also, it is for the good of the
game, where the rules are silent, to assume that while the Rules may
delegate their unlimited scope to sub-documents such as contracts,
that such delegation must be relatively specific and not automatic,
and a mere statement that agreements can be created and be binding
does not make such agreements on par with rules in their ability
to define reality.  Overall, for the purposes of interpreting this
CFJ, the contract+join attempt has more in common with players
communicating (joint) action attempts than it has in common with

Therefore, this court finds that by attempting to agree to this
contract clause, Warrigal+contract together is communicating to
the Agoran courts/Agora as a whole: "I join this contract iff the
Riemann hypothesis is false".  It is reasonable to extend the
precedent of CFJ 1460, covering single statements that directly
contain unreasonably difficult conditionals, to a conditional that's
in part due to Warrigal's statement and in part contained in a
contract.   As a whole, Warrigal fails to reasonably communicate
an action due to the difficulty of resolving the conditional, and
so the action of joining fails.  Therefore, as Warrigal is not
constrained by the contract, it is TRUE that e may transfer assets.