==============================  CFJ 2320  ==============================

    Four days and 5 hours from the time this CFJ was/will be called, it
    will be possible to object to the above intent.


Caller:                                 ehird

Judge:                                  ais523
Judgement:                              TRUE



Called by ehird:                        23 Dec 2008 22:21:28 GMT
Assigned to ais523:                     23 Dec 2008 22:52:19 GMT
Judged TRUE by ais523:                  07 Jan 2009 04:34:07 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

It's probably UNDETERMINED.


Caller's Evidence:

On 23 Dec 2008, at 21:52, Kerim Aydin wrote:

> performing the action or for objecting.  (It could be argued I
> suppose that the time limit for objecting is the time the action is
> performed... but if the action doesn't *actually* occur, that doesn't
> trigger it... does that set up a paradox here?)

Without objection I intend to ratify the following report with a scope
of the SLR: {{
There is a rule numbered 9999, title "Yay", power 3, and text "ehird can
change the gamestate in any way by announcement".


Judge ais523's Arguments:

This case hinges around when the deadline for objection is for objecting
to a dependent action, and whether there is in fact such a deadline. The
interesting complicating point here (apart from the Holiday) is that the
dependent actions rule is written backwards, so to speak. Rule
1728/22(b) says:
       b) A person (the initiator) announced intent to perform the
          action, unambiguously and clearly specifying the action and
          method(s) (including the value of N for each method), at
          most fourteen days earlier, and (if the action depends on
          objections) at least four days earlier.
So the question here is whether (as in ehird's attempted paradox)
intending an action creates a deadline for objection, or whether (as in
Goethe's and my/comex's scam attempt) doing a dependent action creates a
deadline for intending it, or both. I first point out that there is no
contradiction in supposing both are true, because they are deadlines for
different things; but also, that the resolution of Goethe's scam is a
matter for another CFJ, especially as I tried a similar one, and so that
I won't discuss the issue further in this judgement.

The following excerpts from rule 2124/9 are, I think, the most
enlightening on the matter:
      [...] An Objector to a
      dependent action is a first-class player (or other person
      explicitly allowed to object to that action by the rule allowing
      that action to be performed dependently) who has publicly posted
      (and not withdrawn) an objection to the announcement of intent
      to perform the action.


      Agora is Satisfied with an intent to perform a specific action
      if and only if:

      (1) if the action is to be performed Without N Objections, then
          it has fewer than N objectors;

First, note that this means that the verdict on this CFJ is trivially
TRUE, as it is indeed possible to object to a dependent action even
after it's been carried out, by the above definition (although doing so
does nothing). [Note that objecting to a dependent action before it is
carried out - the opposite of this, is more murky, due to the difficulty
of identifying whether the objection is to the announcement of intent in
question before the announcement exists, but again irrelevant to the
case.] So no paradox here. Normally at this point I'd modify the
question to a version which isn't defeated by technicality, but I'm not
sure how to do so in this case [pun noticed but not intended]. So
instead, I simply judge as follows:

CFJ 2320 is TRUE. It is possible to object to a dependent action even
after it is resolved, not that that will do anything.