==============================  CFJ 2701  ==============================

    The LNP is a player


Caller:                                 ais523

Judge:                                  ə

Judge:                                  BobTHJ

Judge:                                  Yally

Judge:                                  Machiavelli

Judge:                                  Tiger

Judge:                                  G.
Judgement:                              TRUE



Called by ais523:                       20 Sep 2009 23:04:59 GMT
Assigned to ə:                          23 Sep 2009 22:23:20 GMT
ə recused:                              12 Oct 2009 23:41:14 GMT
Assigned to BobTHJ:                     14 Oct 2009 18:03:45 GMT
BobTHJ recused:                         21 Oct 2009 19:24:16 GMT
Assigned to Yally:                      25 Oct 2009 16:23:40 GMT
Yally recused:                          07 Nov 2009 19:16:37 GMT
Assigned to Machiavelli:                07 Nov 2009 19:18:27 GMT
Machiavelli recused:                    17 Nov 2009 11:44:41 GMT
Assigned to Tiger:                      17 Nov 2009 11:45:40 GMT
Tiger recused:                          22 Nov 2009 22:41:34 GMT
Assigned to G.:                         28 Nov 2009 23:48:54 GMT
Judged TRUE by G.:                      29 Nov 2009 07:14:20 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

On Thu, 2009-09-17 at 15:58 -0500, Pavitra wrote:
> This may possibly save you, but I'm still not convinced that "to intend"
> is a proper action, despite its grammatical status as a verb. In its
> natural-language meaning, which I maintain that the Rules do not
> overwrite, "I intend" is a description of a passive mental state, like
> "I understand" or "I doubt". It's not an activity that can be either
> effective or ineffective, like lifting a box or spending a coin.
> In short, I am arguing that intent is (1) like contracts, recognized
> rather than defined by the Rules; and (2) a passive mental state, like
> the state of a switch, rather than an action, like flipping the state of
> a switch.

If Pavitra's argument above is correct, then partnerships
cannot intend to perform dependent actions (allegedly a non-action)
without the text of a message that would let them do it being published.


Gratuitous Arguments by Pavitra:

If a contract provides an internal mechanism for accomplishing X, then
beginning that formal, contract-defined process causes the contract to
intend to do X.

(This interpretation derives naturally from the proposition that formal
systems and minds are largely the same thing, and that human minds are
merely particularly complex systems. I grew up on Hofstadter and I'm
proud of it.)


Gratuitous Arguments by ais523:

The issue here is about whether intent is an action (therefore, this
ties in with the arguments about the Points Party). The LNP was picked
here because it cannot act on its own; only via act-on-behalf. If intent
is indeed an action, then everything worked just fine. If it isn't,
however, the quoted part of R2263 prevented the intent from working, by
preventing the LNP doing anything at all; (a) wasn't met, as no message
was given, and (b) and (c) cannot be met unless an action is involved.
So the LNP registered if and only if an intent is an action.


Gratuitous Evidence by ais523:

The text of the LNP:
A Livenomicer CAN act on behalf of the LNP to cause it to intend,
with Agoran Consent, to register, and to resolve this intent.
      Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, acting on behalf of a
      person is INVALID if not published. Such publication is INVALID
      unless it specified the text of the simulated message by:
      (a) clearly stating the text of a message;
      (b) clearly specifying an action (the message states the grantor
          performs the action); or
      (c) performing by announcement an action defined in a public
          contract's text to (clearly and unambiguously) include
          causing the grantor to perform a specific action (the
          message states the grantor performs the action)


Judge G.'s Arguments:

There are two possible uses of "intend" here:
1.  A specific announcement of intent as per R1728, or a similar/
    parallel formal legal "expression of intent" defined in a contract;
2.  The "mind-state" of a conscious entity that has decided it plans
    to perform some action: "the state of a person's mind that directs
    his or her actions toward a specific object."

An important point is that #2 is really irrelevant to this discussion.
Insomuch as we still (vaguely and with reservations) accept the ca.2007
assertion that a partnership might be some sort of "natural" albeit
secondary type of person in the absence of legislation, there is no
suggestion in written or natural law that this makes it a conscious
entity with a mind that can be directed towards an object[*].  Thus, a
contract can only "intend", or "express intent", in a manner formally
recognized by its own charter or the rules governing its charter (in
this case Agoran rules).  So if a contract, or its governing rules,
explicitly define a process of "expressing intent" then it can do so;
but beginning a formal process for a general action is not sufficient
for saying that the contract "intends" to perform the action (this is
a similar fallacy to searching for "original intent" among a group of

I will also point out that, even for a conscious entity, arguably,
posting an "announcement of intent" as per R1728 is a defined legal
announcement, and does not necessarily express a natural "actual"
intent (i.e. state of mind) of any kind!

So "intent" (expressing, feeling, or having) isn't an action, but
"posting an announcement of intent" is.  And I find that the LNP
contract text "cause it to intend, with Agoran Consent" is a clear
and obvious enough reference to R1728 that it empowers the indicated
entities to "post an announcement of intent" as R1728 requires
whether or not the poster (or the contract) naturally "intends" to
complete the action.

Therefore this worked.  TRUE.

[*}Only when a contract is sufficiently complex that we may talk
meaningfully about its free will or at least passing a Turing Test,
may we accept that it might express or possess a "natural" intent.
But once we accept that, we could no longer treat it as a second-
class person, and questions about its invididuality with respect
to its contract would be raised, to say the least.