==============================  CFJ 2737  ==============================

    G. has cast an infinite number of votes on proposal 6581.


Caller:                                 G.

Judge:                                  scshunt

Judge:                                  omd

Judge:                                  Murphy
Judgement:                              FALSE



Called by G.:                           17 Nov 2009 18:15:16 GMT
Assigned to scshunt:                    28 Nov 2009 23:50:24 GMT
scshunt recused:                        14 Dec 2009 17:10:17 GMT
Assigned to omd:                        14 Dec 2009 17:14:10 GMT
omd recused:                            08 Jan 2010 23:09:03 GMT
Assigned to Murphy:                     08 Jan 2010 23:11:40 GMT
Judged FALSE by Murphy:                 19 Jan 2010 09:22:25 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

There are two conflicting ideas:

1.  Performing an pragmatically-impossible number of actions by saying
you do doesn't work.  [CFJ 1584 upheld in CFJs 1728 and 1962].

2.  If a legal construct (e.g. rule or contract) creates a platonically
infinite process that functions "instantaneously" without finite time
delay when is triggered by a single (finite) event, it can in fact lead
to an infinite result.  This was never subject to CFJ that I can find,
but was accepted without argument at least once, circa 2005, when
triggered by a rule change.  The rules read:
(clause 1)
  "Whenever the Hand Size of the Library is less than 5, the Library
   gains one Pending Draw."
(clause 2)
  "The hand size of an entity equals the cards it holds plus its
   Pending Draws".
Initially, (clause 2) limited the effects of (clause 1).   Due to a
rules refactor, "plus its pending draws" was deleted from (clause 2),
so as soon as the hand size of the library was less than 5, the
"whenever" was satisfied constantly, instantaneously and continuously
and so pending draws were continuously added (i.e. for any finite number
of draws added, you could say that one more had been added).  It was
"generally agreed" that the Library had gained an infinite number of
pending draws (which were then canceled by the proposal that fixed
clause 2).

If the judge requests it, I can dig up the proposals and rules for the
above card situation if there are not enough details listed here.

If the pledge above doesn't work on a technicality, the judge is asked
to opine on whether there is a slightly-modified version (for example
if I made a contract with another person to trigger the process) that
would work.


Caller's Evidence:

[Triggering pledge and action].
> I pledge the following:
>  Whenever I state that I zinf a decision to adopt a proposal in its voting
>  period, it means that I cast one vote FOR the indicated decision and
>  immediately thereafter zinf that decision.  I CAN terminate this pledge
>  by announcement.
> I zinf the decision to adopt proposal 6581.


Gratuitous Arguments by G.:

The following permutation of my attempt is in the category of "technical
variations" of my attempted actions that I asked the judge to consider:

c. wrote:
> Hmm, but this is just a definition, and definitions in contracts are
> just shorthand for writing the whole thing out-- which you (probably)
> couldn't do in this case, so it doesn't work.
> Well, *most* definitions in contracts.
> I agree to the following:
> {
> This is a public contract and a pledge.
> Finzing a proposal is an action which consists of voting FOR the
> decision to adopt it, then acting on behalf of comex to finz the same
> proposal.
> }
> I finz proposal 6581.
> See Rule 2263:
> ...   (c) performing by announcement an action defined in a public
>          contract's text to (clearly and unambiguously) include
>          causing the grantor to perform a specific action (the
>          message states the grantor performs the action)


Judge Murphy's Arguments:

These ideas are not contradictory.  Platonic effects can be
infinite (idea #2), but actions cannot (idea #1).  This statement
pertains to an attempt at infinite actions, so #1 is relevant.

As requested, I opine that the concept of infinite actions is
sufficiently at odds with the ordinary-language concept of actions
that it can only be enabled by a rule explicitly stating that some
finite action is legally equivalent to infinite actions; attempting
to set up an induction chain via 2263(c) is not explicit enough.