==============================  CFJ 3288  ==============================

    I own multiple Machiavelli trading cards.


Caller:                                 omd

Judge:                                  Roujo
Judgement:                              FALSE



Called by omd:                          05 Nov 2012 23:59:51 GMT
Assigned to Roujo:                      11 Nov 2012 19:13:54 GMT
Judged FALSE by Roujo:                  13 Nov 2012 15:14:14 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

None of the promises I attempted to cash were "copies" of
each other, because (despite the rules defining them as fungible) they
had different properties, namely asset possession.


Caller's Evidence:

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Tanner Swett <swettt@mail.gvsu.edu> wrote:
> Well, gee, ais523's promises seem to be being pretty effective.
> I submit 7 promises: "I transfer a Machiavelli trading card to the
> cashier." Conditions for cashing: (a) in the same message, the cashier
> gives me a trading card I did not already own a copy of; (b) the
> cashier has not already cashed another copy of this promise in the
> same message; and (c) if the cashier is omd, e has not already cashed
> another copy of this promise at any time in the past. I can destroy
> these promises unconditionally.

I transfer an omd trading card to Machiavelli.  I transfer one of the
quoted promises that is still owned by the Tree to me and cash it.

I create a Slave Golem named "Mr. A", and cause it to create a promise
with text { I deregister. } and transfer it to me.  I transfer Mr. A
to one of the aforementioned promises that is still owned by the Tree,
transfer that promise to me, and cash it.
I repeat these steps with golems named "Mr. B", "Mr. C", "Mr. D", and "Mr. E".
I cash all the promises that the aforementioned Golems transferred to me.

CFJ 2743, I guess.


Gratuitous Arguments by Machiavelli:

Generally, an object is considered to be a "copy" of
another if it is intended to be essentially identical to it. A
hand-made copy of a painting is by no means identical to the original,
but the copy is intended to resemble the original as closely as
possible. If one takes a photograph of a painting and then gives the
subject a mustache, the photograph is a derivative work, not a
copy—not because the photograph is different from the original
painting, but because it is intentionally and significantly different.

The seven promises I created are identical in text and functionality,
and they were intended to be essentially identical; clearly, I did not
intentionally introduce any differences between them. I think it's
also clear that when I wrote the word "copy", I intended for all of
the promises to be considered copies, because otherwise, I'm open to


Judge Roujo's Arguments:

If the lack of any difference whatsoever in any defining property was
necessary for two things/assets/promises/what-have-you to be considered copies
of one another, they would have to have the same owner, date of creation,
physical location - *atoms*, even. Essentially, copies would not exist as
they'd have to be one and the same. Counterfeiting would be a non-issue, sure,
but "I create X copies of the following promise" would be impossible: if you
can say how many there are, it means that they're different in some way, so
they're not copies using the most strict meaning of the word.

That's why the general, popular meaning of "copy" follows what Italy argued
here, that is something that is essentially identical while allowing some
differences such as possession, Unique ID and other such metadata. Since
copy/copies isn't defined nor mentioned in the rules, it is to that meaning we
should fall back (R754). Hence, since Antony had already cashed a copy of that
promise, e couldn't cash another since the promise's cashing condition
couldn't evaluate as TRUE anymore.