==============================  CFJ 3375  ==============================

    Immediately after this message is published, it will be IMPOSSIBLE
    to cash the promise cited in evidence.


Caller:                                 G.

Judge:                                  scshunt
Judgement:                              FALSE



Called by G.:                           11 Jul 2013 03:48:20 GMT
Assigned to scshunt:                    15 Jul 2013 17:47:59 GMT
Judged FALSE by scshunt:                15 Jul 2013 19:48:29 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

Due to it violating my R101(ii and/or v) rights.


Caller's Evidence:

> I submit the following promise:
> Text:  As punishment, I transfer 10 Yaks to the casher of this
>        promise.
> Conditions for Cashing:  This promise has been in existence for
> 10 seconds or more, and G. has published a message at any time
> after this promise was submitted.


Judge scshunt's Arguments:

For 3375, we have a more interesting and specific query as to the
effect of Rule 101. Specifically, does it, by allowing no
interpretation of a rule in a way as to limit rights, prevent the
Promise from being cashed? Accordingly the question breaks into two
 a) Would cashing that promise according to the usual interpretation
cause something to occur contrary to G.'s rights under Rule 101?
 b) If so, would this constitute a limitation or removal of eir rights?
 c) If so, is the correct interpretation of the rules, taking Rule 101
into account, that the promise is uncashable?

I will address question b) first.

In this circumstance, would the protective clause of Rule 101 apply to
a limitation of a right which G. has clearly agreed to? In other
words, does Rule 101 allow for waiver of the rights contained therein?
It seems appropriate to refer to the Constitution of the United States
of America. Consider the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

The right against self-incrimination has been held to be absolute and
inviolable. However, this right can be waived, explicitly or
implicitly, and such has not been held to be a violation of the
Constitution. Once the waiver is made, it is possible for the
individual to be compelled to be a witness against himself, as the
right no longer applies.

There is an additional wrinkle in the Agoran context. Rule 101 says
that "that no interpretation of Agoran law or binding agreement may
substantially limit or remove a person's rights as defined by this
Rule". This phrase could be taken to forbid waivers as a limitation or
removal of a right.

However, when we look at the purpose of a right, there is some helpful
guidance. The purpose of a right is to protect an individual, and
provide that individual with the power to ensure that certain things
are respective. It is, generally, the power of an individual not to
choose to enforce their right. This should not be seen as in any way
diminishing that right, as in general it in fact enhances the right by
making the law more flexible and useful. While there may be exceptions
(as is common in tenancy and employment law), the fundamental purpose
of a right should be borne in mind.

With this stated, it seems that, absent an explicit statement to the
contrary, a waiver of a right should not be construed as a limitation
or removal of it. The degree to which a waiver of a right may allow a
rule or agreement to take effect where it ordinarily would not is not
the subject of this judgment, which concerns the situation where a
rule which does not ordinarily violate rights may do so.

In this situation, G., by submitting a promise that may take an action
contrary to his rights, has clearly contemplated that the promise may
do so and deemed the consequences acceptable. It is not the place of
the Court to question this action. G. has implicitly waived his right
to be free from punishment in this case, and as such, CFJ 3375 is